To kill a king: Prabhakaran summarily executed?

May 21, 2009. There has been growing speculation that Velupillai Prabhakaran, the feared leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was executed at point-blank range by Sri Lankan Army special forces on the afternoon or evening of Monday May 18.

The strongest speculation is that Prabhakaran was executed with one or two gunshots in the back of the head, using a calibre and bullet-trajectory pre-planned to preserve the visual identity of his cadaver, while demonstrating unambiguously that he was dead.

Roachbane does not know if these rumours are necessarily the truth, but they are intriguing - some would say compelling.

Roachbane has also, however, received suggestions that, in contrast to the claims of special forces involvement, Prabhakaran was in fact shot by his own bodyguards to prevent capture.

An admission that Prabhakaran is dead, and a tribute to his martyrdom, are said to be being prepared for publication on the “Tamilnet” website. However, there is fierce internal debate over whether to publish it, or whether Prabhakaran is indeed dead.

The fatal shot

The most interesting speculations suggest that Prabhakaran and his immediate coterie – no more than a handful of bodyguards and functionaries – "encountered" special forces, acting under independent command, but operating in close conjunction with the 58th Division of the Sri Lankan army, on a small island in the Nandithal Lagoon.

According to these suggestions, special forces personnel, acting in direct liaison with senior command in Colombo, confirmed the capture of Prabhakaran and were instructed to complete the operation according to a pre-specified codeword.

Prabhakaran was made to lie face down on the ground and, with his eyes open and still not knowing his fate, shot through the back of the head.

The bullet was fired in well-lit conditions to ensure accuracy. A low-calibre bullet from a hand-held pistol was used, with an experienced assassin pulling the trigger. The angle of shot was from the back of the head, at approximately level of the lower jaw, upwards at an angle through the centre of the brain and out through the forehead.

This angle was chosen in advance of the operation. The goal was to leave Prabhakaran’s face intact, enabling objective visual identification, while leaving a clearly visible exit wound above the line of his eyes to convince viewers he was dead.

The small-calibre bullet was chosen to ensure that only a limited amount of Prabhakaran’s skull, and none of his face, would be blown out by the exiting bullet. For the same reason, Prabhakaran’s face was pushed downwards into the soft, wet ground prior to the shot.

The actual shooting may have been videoed.

Presenting the evidence

Such speculative accounts of Prabhakaran's demise are at odds with other suggestions, whose veracity cannot be ruled out, which suggest that Prabhakaran in fact died at the hands of his LTTE bodyguards. These reports are considered below.

First, however, it should be noted that prior to making video footage for publicity, Prabhakaran's cadaver may have been cleaned and made visually presentable. Roachbane has not been able to determine whether he was shaved and fitted in a fresh uniform by special forces, or whether he had done this himself prior to the "encounter". It is also possible that his moustache was dyed to resemble his public image more closely.

The “dog tag” and identity card presented with the body may also have been fakes presented to increase the plausibility of Prabhakaran’s identity.

Some errors were made by senior leaders in Sri Lanka in their eagerness to get the news out. For instance, initial claims from the military described the body as “bullet ridden” when it was in fact untouched. Other accounts, based on a mis-identification the previous day, claimed it was “scorched” or “burnt”. But in large part, the publicity operation was carried out with great success.

Even the army’s implausible story that Prabhakaran was gunned down during an attempted break-out – in a convoy of light vehicles including an ambulance – was believed.

Video supports the account

Video evidence of Prabhakaran’s corpse supports the accounts of "execution" theorists, and refutes the account of the Sri Lankan Army in which Prabhakaran was supposedly shot down while trying to escape.

There is not a single wound, bullet-hole or bloodstain on Prabhakran’s uniform, arms or face.

The exit wound in the forehead could only have been made by an angled shot from below, and probably from behind.

A self-inflicted shot from below the chin could also have made the wound, and two red marks are visible in this region on Prabhakaran’s cadaver. However, these marks do not resemble entry-wounds and the angle required to achieve the exit wound in his forehead would be difficult to achieve without damage to the face.

One or more shots in the back of the head therefore appear to be the most likely cause of death. These could have been administered by a Sri Lankan executioner, or by an LTTE cadre.

What is certain is that the nature of Prabhakaran’s wounds and the condition of the body are totally inconsistent with the official account of the Sri Lankan army.

Why was he killed?

Discussions at the highest level of the Sri Lankan government probably concluded several months ago that it was not in the interests of the state that Prabhakaran or indeed any of the LTTE’s top military commanders should be taken alive.

While many Sri Lankan citizens would have welcomed a public trial, it would be divisive and humiliating for the Tamil population, would allow the secessionist cause a major public platform, and a death sentence would attract considerable international controversy. Moreover, it would have bolstered Prabhakaran’s inevitable status as a martyr.

Furthermore, it was the wish of the executive that victory should be followed quickly by reconstruction and a forward-looking perspective. A prolonged trial would prevent quick progress towards their dream of a new Sri Lanka.

Some supporters of the "execution" theory beleive that special forces may have been placed on standby as early as February 2009 with a clear, but adaptable and continually updated plan, for the execution of Prabhakaran if the opportunity arose.

The LTTE response

How Prabhakaran could have fallen alive into the Sri Lankan Army’s custody is not clear. One possibility is that he was hoodwinked into surrendering with a bogus offer of exile.

The Tamilnet website has already condemned the trickery of the Sri Lankan army in offering a safe passage to LTTE “civil officers” and then “massacring” them. So far, however, it has not admitted that Prabhakaran himself was killed in this or a similar act of deception.

Indeed, Roachbane’s understanding is that there is still some confusion in international LTTE circles about the fate of Prabhakaran. The confusion surrounds the fact that Prabhakaran had one (not two, as is sometimes claimed) highly effective body double. The body double is beleived to have a similar build and facial bone structure to Prabhakaran, but to be younger and taller.

There are some claims within the organisation that the cadaver shown on Sri Lankan television is in fact the body double, who was shot by LTTE cadre. The dog-tag and identity card were placed upon his person by the Tigers in order to fool the Sri Lankan army, while the real Prabhakaran made good his escape.

This account cannot yet be conclusively refuted.

The situation is confused by the fact that the body-double was used in some LTTE photographs and videos of Prabhakaran.

Furthermore, Roachbane understands that DNA tests on the supposed body of Prabhakaran, based on samples obtained from India, were not carried out. The Sri Lankan state does not have access to Indian DNA records.

DNA tests could be conducted to establish if there is a paternity relationship between the “Prabhakaran” corpse and the cadaver believed to be that of his son, Charles Anthony, but these tests are unlikely to be published, and may not have been carried out.

The international wing of the LTTE has been hoping desperately for evidence that their leader is still alive. For this reason the main LTTE website, Tamilnet, has not yet admitted that Prabhakaran is dead.

There are also elements within the organization who, while believing Prabhakaran is dead, consider it of strategic value to propagate the myth that he is still alive – a figure of hope to the Tamil people, and fear to the Sinhalese.

The most rapidly-growing view within the LTTE, however, is that Prabhakaran is indeed dead, and the sooner it is acknowledged the better. These forces are gaining ground, but remain a minority position for now.

Prabhakaran’s family murdered?

Roachbane has no information on reports that Prabhakaran’s wife and two younger children have been found shot in the head in the lagoon close to where the LTTE leader’s body was supposedly found.

If confirmed, this will inevitably lead to difficult speculations about who killed them.

Despite their abysmal human rights record which includes numerous murders, rapes and assuaults including crimes against minors, it is unlikely in the circumstances operating at the time that Sri Lankan army regulars, or indeed special forces, would have executed children with point-blank head shots.

Unpalatable though it is, a stronger likelihood is that they were killed on the orders of Prabhakaran himself when he considered his own death to be inevitable.

This would place Prabhakaran within a long line of dictatorial or cult leaders who ordered the deaths of those around them when their world collapsed.

Examples of this well-established psychiatric pathology – known to occur in arrogant, delusory and/or dictatorial men whose view of themselves and reality is brutally refuted by events – include Adolf Hitler, Jim Jones of the Jonestown massacre, and David Koresh of the Waco conflagration among others. A related pathology is exhibited by the numerous anonymous little bullies who kill their families prior to their own suicide when their lives fall apart.

However, if Prabhakaran did indeed order his family’s death, then the likelihood is increased that, notwithstanding the information Roachbane has received, it was in fact, as some reports suggest, an LTTE bullet that killed him – and a bullet fired on his own orders.

In this scenario, the death-shot would most likely have been administered when capture was literally just seconds away. If the LTTE had had more time, they would certainly have destroyed or burned the body.

The reports of the death of Prabhakaran’s family, or of the nature of their deaths, may yet prove false, however – another triumph for the masterful public relations machine of the Sri Lankan army and state.

Finally, there has been some speculation within the organization that Prabhakaran killed himself with cyanide when capture was inevitable, and that the bullet-shot was administered to his corpse, either by an LTTE cadre to ensure he was dead, or by the Sri Lankan army for public relations purposes as described above.

The whole truth is never likely to be known, or universally believed.

What is certain, however, is that the defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka has been spectacularly comprehensive, and that the specifics of how it was done, and of Prabhakaran’s fate, will be debated for years.

(12) Where next? - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

This Roachbane's twelfth and final "backgrounder" post on the civil war in Sri Lanka. If you have time, start with number one and finish with this one.

Since this is the last "backgrounder" post, I would like to list once again the provisos I set out in my first entry.

Roachbane is not Sri Lankan, but has significant contacts, including highly-placed Sinhalese and Tamils, both inside Sri Lanka and internationally. My first-hand experience of the conflict is more limited than that of Sri Lankans, and its emotional significance is less personally profound. Nonetheless, as with current affairs anywhere in the world, outside views have their place.

And at least I will not be pigeon-holed as belonging to one side or the other.

For readers who don't know much about the conflict, these twelve posts will provide you with a useful summary of its origins, and where things are now.

For Sri Lankans, please read the posts as an outsider's view, without feeling too sensitive. I am critical of all sides, at times in robust language; but I would not have written the posts if I did not revere Sri Lanka and all its peoples.

And now to my comments.

Crimes have been committed in defeating the LTTE. Crimes are still being committed against the northern Tamils.

In the fullness of time, the unnecessary continuation of the war, and the subsequent treatment of Tamil civilians in the north of Sri Lanka – particularly if atrocities are uncovered – may yet see President Rajapaksa invited to The Hague.

Rajapaksa and his two brothers, whom he has made powerful ministers in his government, are said by some to be part of a corrupt clan who are amassing personal fortunes from the offices they hold. I have no idea if these rumours are true, or just gossip.

But once the current military phase concludes, it is conceivable that Rajapaksa will make some sensible decisions, and work towards a new, devolved political structure with real power sharing, taking in not only the Tamils in their various groups, but also the Muslims and smaller groups, not least the Veddhas.

Most Tamils – most Sri Lankans and international observers, in fact – think Rajapaksa is not up to it. They think he is a corrupt bully whose only real interests are money and nationalist glory.

But I am not sure. I think Rajapaksa may yet surprise people – although sadly, I may be proved wrong.

The military defeat of the LTTE will give him the power to push through real reforms, perhaps even achieve a just settlement for all Sri Lanka’s minorities – something neither of the main political parties has been able to do for decades, since the other would play the nationalist card to prevent substantive concessions.

But as a war victor, and with the Tamils massively weakened, he also has the power to do evil. The mass colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese, for instance? Certainly some of his more unsavoury bedfellows will lobby him to change the demographics of the country decisively in favour of the Sinhalese.

For the international community, the immediate and urgent need is to provide humanitarian support, and above all, to press for truly comprehensive, independent monitoring in the North.

But in the longer term, they must make sure the right thing is done by the Tamils - and the island's other minorities, such as the Muslims, Burghers and Veddhas. India in particular must play a role here, especially with respect to the Tamils. One hopes it will able to do more once its election season concludes.

If evidence emerges of major abuses of the Tamil population, such as prolonged incarceration in camps or widespread systematic violence against civilians, or if any effort is made by the Sri Lankan state to alter the demographics of the North, there will be pressure on India to consider military intervention.

For Colombo’s intellectuals, the message is simple – do the right thing. Don’t turn a blind eye to evil, no matter which side commits it; don’t connive with it; don’t wash your hands of people in need. You are part of a wider world of ideas and ethics, and will be judged accordingly; so don't behave as if your world stopped at the Colombo city limits.

For the Tamils: the LTTE is defeated, but not dead. Indeed, after its military defeat, there may be an upsurge in terrorist attacks. But the urgent task now is to think of the wider Tamil cause, and do what is necessary to shore it up, even if that means moving beyond the LTTE.

For indeed, we need now to move beyond the era of the LTTE – at least, beyond the era of the LTTE in its murderous, intolerant, unimaginative Prabhakaran phase.

It is time to move into different ground, with fresh goals, fresh values and fresh methods. Tamils in the diaspora will have a key role in shaping how imaginative, energetic and effective the next phase of the Tamils' struggle for a better life will be.

For people interested in discussing where to go next in Sri Lanka, one useful staring point is the Sahasamvada blogspot and its associated links. Hardliners on either side will not like this site, and nothing can appear neutral from all perspectives, but I think it is worthwhile, written in a spirit of tolerance, full of useful links, and technically excellent. Please let me know your own favourite blogspots and websites.

(11) The feverish atmoshpere in Colombo - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

This post has been taken down to protect the identity of Roachbane's informants in Colombo

(10) Problems of perception - Tamils and the diaspora - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

These days, the LTTE’s strongest support probably comes from the diaspora communities in countries such as the UK, France, Canada and USA. The LTTE has well-organized networks in these communities.

More diaspora Tamils than Tamils in northern Sri Lanka see the LTTE as the representatives and protectors in Lanka – “Our boys” – and Prabhakaran as the “father of the nation.” The LTTE does have support in northern Lanka, but people’s feelings there are more ambiguous and jaded.

The terrible experiences of Tamil civilians in the “safe zone”, when they were held and used as human shields by the LTTE, will in due course lead to further questioning of the LTTE. This will begin among Tamils in Sri Lanka, but also take hold in the diaspora communities.

The LTTE’s strong organization within the diaspora communities may, however, limit the degree of overt public questioning.

And indeed, one of the upshots of the crimes of the Sri Lankan army and the incarceration of the northern population in camps may be to strengthen the LTTE once again, both inside and outside Sri Lanka. Tamils in the Vanni region and in the diaspora might easily be persuaded that the LTTE were right all along, since without the Tigers’ protection, monstrous things were done by the Sri Lankan state.

In my view, it would benefit the Tamil cause greatly if Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora tried now to think and plan beyond the LTTE – or at the very least, beyond what it became under Prabhakaran.

For while the LTTE gave strength to the Tamil cause, they ultimately failed, and failed the Tamil people, not only because the coalition lined up against them was too strong, but because they were inflexible, unimaginative, too ready to murder non-combatants, and too eager to condemn alternative viewpoints as treason.

And just like their Sinhalese foes they were controlled by nationalist strings. Prabhakaran spoke not long ago of how, when he thought of all the cadres who had died, he could not give up on the dream of Eelam, for if he abandoned the ultimate goal of secession, they would have died for nothing.

As if Sinhalese people standing at the memorials in Colombo and Galle and Hambantota, or looking at the faded photographs of their dead sons, did not feel exactly the same emotion!

It is not a good idea to found policy on loyalty to the dead. What matters is living people – all the people of Sri Lanka.

The military defeat of the LTTE is far from the end of the Tigers. But it has placed the Tamils in northern Sri Lanka in a situation of desperate vulnerability. They desperately need the diaspora’s help – but with new ideas, new organization, creativity, innovation and courage.

(9) Problems of perception - supporters of the state - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

Many opponents of the LTTE accuse them of being intransigent. They complain that the LTTE is fanatically devoted to secession and will not compromise – say, with a new federal constitution, or regional devolution.

Actually, after decades of foolhardy intransigence when offered reasonable devolution-based solutions, by 2002-3 the LTTE was prepared to compromise – not that its enemies believed them. It was the refusal of Mahinda Rajapaksa and his extreme right-wing allies to accept a federal solution that closed the door to compromise.

But the real point is this. Sinhalese nationalists and their apologists have been every bit as intransigent as the LTTE. Their intransigence lies in not being able to conceive of a partition of Sri Lanka.

And it is not just the extremists who are caught up in this intransigence. It seems self-evident and obvious to many Sri Lankans that their island is a single nation and that the geographical border of their state should be the ocean shore. The idea that the land should be divided appears to them to be a monstrous and irrational proposition.

But in truth, the notion of a separate state for the Tamils is absolutely reasonable as a concept. There is no historical, economic, demographic or moral reason why the island of Lanka should all be under the control of the same, unitary state.

Neither is the notion of self-determination for the Tamils, or for the North and East, intrinsically unreasonable. There is no reason why referenda should not be held in these regions to determine whether their inhabitants want a separate state.

Personally, I think that a partition of Sri Lanka would be a bad idea. I favour a strong federal constitution, with a power-sharing structure for the central executive, and possibly full independence for the Jaffna peninsula in a manner similar to that ceded to Singapore by Malaya. But while I think partition would be a mistake, as a proposition it is reasonable, and there is nothing in the history of Sri Lanka, modern or ancient, that mitigates against it.

And so my message to Sinhalese nationalists and their apologists who support a unitary state is as follows:

Try to realise that the emotions you feel about the contiguity of your island are false emotions. When you feel that sense of Lankan unity dancing through your heart and setting you aglow, what you are really feeling is the bite within you of a puppeteer’s string.

Your puppeteer is the demon of White, Western nationalism. The fact that you cannot imagine or countenance even the concept of the partition of Ceylon is evidence of how deeply, and for how many long generations and decades, you and your leaders have been in his thrall.

Similarly, when you get angry – more than angry, enraged – at what you label as ignorant outsiders’ meddling, just think for a moment. Your anger is far too hot. Once again, the nationalist string is pulling within you, along with a second string whose bite is also of such second nature you think it is an intrinsic part of you, such that you have learned to savour it and enjoy your indignation.

This is the string of post-colonial resentment. You detest your former masters still telling you what is best. You detest being patronised by these hypocrites. This is why you are so eager to get into bed with countries like China and Iran, who, quite apart from cash, give you the “respect” you crave, but smirk behind your back at how easy it is to push your buttons.

Your assumptions about the natural unity of Sri Lanka as a country, and the anger you feel when people question the concept of a single, unitary “nation”, are irrational. They are indicative of pathology. The cure is to cut the cords and stand on your own two feet, truly and not in the ugly and contorted way one does on puppeteers’ strings.

(8) What are the main concerns at the moment? - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

The most pressing concern just now - although as I write this, perhaps only for a few hours - is for the plight of civilian Tamils trapped in the fighting. Many thousands are confined with the LTTE in a tiny coastal strip, surrounded by the Sri Lankan army and navy, and prevented by the Tigers from leaving.

They are being shot, bombed and shelled by the army. They are being herded about as human shields by the Tigers, and shot if they try to escape. If they do get away, they are put in prison camps by the army. They are traumatised and starving.

The army has the area encircled, but is continuing to prosecute the war. It claims to be using small-arms only, but this is a lie: reports from non-combatants in the zone, aerial photography and the nature of injuries, which include blast, burn and shrapnel wounds, all point conclusively to the continued use of shelling and bombing.

The area has not been carpet-bombed, and there has clearly been at least some attempt by the army to limit civilian casualties while continuing to take the fight forcefully to the LTTE. But the shelling and bombing have been savage nonetheless, and seem to have become more intense as the army has sought to “finish the job.”

For some weeks, most Western nations have been calling on the Sri Lankan state to cease military operations, to provide the beleaguered civilians with humanitarian aid, and to try to negotiate their release and the peaceful surrender of the trapped LTTE cadre. The Sri Lankan state has refused.

Since the continued action is (a) unnecessary and (b) killing civilians in large numbers, it is probably a war crime.

Nonetheless, a ceasefire is almost certainly not going to happen. All one can hope for is that the army will complete its operations swiftly and with minimal loss of life to civilians, LTTE cadres and its own soldiers.

A second major concern is what is happening to Tamil civilians in the North once they fall into the hands of the Sri Lankan army.

Much of the northern Tamil population under the age of 60 is being imprisoned in camps. This incarceration is supposedly for “humanitarian” reasons, but also for screening to identify Tiger cadres.

Moreover, the entire operation has been proceeding without international observers. The Sri Lankan government has called on international agencies to help supply food and medicine, and is belatedly inviting the UN to inspect a few of the camps, but what it is offering is far too little and much too late.

It is difficult to escape the analogy with Western-style concentration camps. In particular, Sri Lanka’s prison camps are reminiscent of the camps used by the British to confine the Boer population during the Boer War. These too were established with ostensive “humanitarian” functions when their true purpose was to control and vanquish a population.

There is also a major concern about what happens to young Tamil men and women, both at the pre-camp processing stage, and after they are placed in these camps. There are worries that suspected Tiger cadre are being “disappeared” by the army – that is, interred or secretly murdered.

There are worries too of what is happening in the camps themselves – rapes, systematic starvation, denial of access to medical services, and “disappearances” have all been reported.

There is no proof of these reports, and we must hope that they are false. The government has been extremely effective at denying access to the press, UN or humanitarian and human rights organizations. Their refusal to permit comprehensive independent monitoring is extremely worrying, since in the past the Sri Lankan army had killed thousands of civilians in atrocities documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

The international community needs to exert all the pressure it can to secure detailed and extensive monitoring of what is happening in the North. Ideally, an independent, international force should be sent in, but unless there is a radical policy shift in India, that is inconceivable.

(7) What swung the war in the state's favour? - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

The war swung decisively against the LTTE following the election of Sri Lanka’s prime minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa, to the office of President of Sri Lanka in November 2005.

Rajapaksa campaigned as an aggressive nationalist and a warmonger, and this is what he delivered. But the great irony is that he only won because the Tamils in the northern part of the country did not take part in the vote.

Had they done so, the previous Prime Minster, Ranil Wickremasinghe of the UNP, would have won. As prime minister, Wickremasinghe had negotiated with the LTTE. The two sides agreed a ceasefire, and the LTTE had dropped its claim to full independence, although many distrusted them.

But Wickremasinghe’s government was sacked by the President, Chandrika Kumaratunga of the SLFP, to prevent him making a deal. Kumaratunga also made deals with extreme right-wing parties to form a new political entity, the United People’s Freedom Alliance. Having sacked Wickremasinghe, Kumaratunga ordered fresh elections in 2004 and her new grouping won, with Rajapaksa becoming prime minister.

The condition of endorsement for his candidacy by the extreme right-wing parties was that he would insist on a unitary, centralised state – not the federal structure proposed by Wickremasinghe.

Then came the all-important 2005 presidential election, which was contested between Wickremasinghe and Rajapaksa. Had Wickremasinghe won, there would have been a chance for the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE to conclude a settlement along federalist lines – although the intransigence of the Tigers could still have proved a significant barrier.

But in the event, the northern Tamils boycotted the election, and Rajapaksa won by a whisker.

Why did the northern Tamils boycott the vote? Bizarrely, because the LTTE leadership ordered them to.

In the West we talk about “turkeys voting for Christmas;” the Tigers abstained for extinction. It was a stupid decision – and a baffling one.

Perhaps Prabhakaran thought that allowing the Tamils to take part in the Sri Lankan election would legitimise the concept of a unitary State. Perhaps he thought that even if Wickremasinghe were to win the elections, the peace negotiations have a poor prognosis. Perhaps he thought the LTTE could win militarily. Perhaps he was just too used to war to know anything else.

Probably it was a combination of all these things – but whatever his thinking was, it was a disastrous miscalculation.

Disastrous because the outside world had changed.

The West had lost moral authority through its bloodthirsty military adventures, particularly in Iraq, and its slavish support for an increasingly vicious Israel.

At the same time, global economic growth and political realignments meant that new powers, like China and Iran, were looking for clients. They sought out dirty regimes the world over who were desperate for money and respect. The Sri Lankan government sat up and begged. A new “dirty consensus” took shape, based on the proposition that states can do whatever they please to their own people, and Sri Lanka signed on with pride.

Pakistan also saw a chance to extend its regional influence, and to needle India.

But in fact, just about everybody wanted the LTTE extirpated. India, the UK and the USA all played their part with monetary support and military “advice”, and ensured too that Western financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank came into line.

With support on such a scale, Sri Lanka was able to build and finance a powerful army, navy, and air force, with modern weapons and outside expertise on how to use them. The army adopted sensible, patient military tactics, concentrating overwhelming force on successive, small tracts of territory to reclaim lands taken by the Tigers in bite-sized chunks.

The defection of many erstwhile Tigers in the East under the rebel leadership of Colonel Karuna, also helped the government’s cause. The dictatorial treatment of the Eastern Tamils by their Northern cousins under Prabhakaran contributed to this disastrous split.

The Sinhalese state even won hands down on propaganda, successfully labelling the Tigers as “terrorists” and positioning the confrontation as part of the global, post 9/11 “War on Terror”.

The LTTE leadership did nothing to counter any of this, and remained trapped by Prabhakaran’s outdated, intransigent mind-set. They led their cadres, and worse still the Tamil cause, into a strategic, military, political, public relations and humanitarian disaster.

Like any bystander, I have much sympathy with the oppressed Tamils, and I don’t want to hurt anyone’s sensibilities, especially not those of victims in midst of their suffering. But it is necessary to face up to where things went wrong.

In World War I, we saw lions led by donkeys; in Sri Lanka, it was Tigers led by monkeys.

(6) Who are the "fascists"? - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

Supporters of either side of the Sri Lankan conflict routinely call the other fascist or Nazi – falling back, alas, on European analogies once again. The truth is that no group in Sri Lanka is Nazi– although Sinhala nationalist parties such as the JVP and JHU, come closest. The JVP even describes itself as a “socialist nationalist” party.

Both sides in the conflict have unsavoury people in charge, but it should be kept in mind that the Sri Lankan government is at least elected, albeit on the back of ugly nationalist sentiments. The LTTE has at times enjoyed considerable popular support among the Tamils, particularly in the North, but its mandate comes from the gun.

The Sri Lankan government is also answerable to the laws of the state, albeit that Lanka’s legal institutions are weak and biased, whereas the LTTE has been answerable chiefly to its dictatorial leader, Prabhakaran.

Nonetheless, as a social, political, psychological and cultural phenomenon, Sinhalese ethno-religious nationalism is clearly more akin than is LTTE/Tamil nationalism to right-wing nationalisms in Europe – and also to militant Islam.

Sinhalese nationalism is right-wing, grandiloquent, sulky, angry, masculine, extravagant in its intolerances, testosterone-infused, hot-headed, bloodthirsty and braying. Tamil Nationalism under the LTTE is left-wing, cold, determined, utilitarian, murderous, systematic, ruthless and disturbingly well-regimented.

Both forms are terrifying in their own way; but if one had to find an analogy in the West for LTTE/Tamil nationalism, one should look not at fascism, but at Eastern Europe during the Stalinist era.

Yet in one regard the LTTE does echo the Nazis. This is in the disastrous situation in which the leadership now finds itself. They have allowed one man – Prabhakaran – to become absolutely powerful within his organization and utterly invulnerable to replacement from within, but at one and the same time, disastrously ignorant of the realities outside his world.

Hitler and Stalin became insulated, isolated, ignorant, murderous gods. In terms of personality, Prabhakaran is more similar to Stalin than Hitler, since he is calculating and ruthless, not unstable and incandescent; but if, as suspected, he is currently in a bunker with foes blasting down the gate, it is inevitably with Berlin, and with Hitler, that his last days will be compared by his foes.

(5) Tamil nationalism and the LTTE - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

Like the Sinhalese, the Tamils became mired in nationalist sentiment in the decades before independence. Not all the early Tamil nationalists wanted secession, but their demands could be wild and their rhetoric shrill.

For instance, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, led by GG Ponnambalam, lobbied for a “fifty-fifty” policy in which half the seats in the legislature should be for Tamils and other minorities, with the Sinhalese only getting half the seats despite their demographic superiority. This was never going to wash – though considering how the Sinhalese have abused their majority status, one can see the point.

Ponnambalam also militated against Sinhalese nationalism, supposedly claiming in one notorious 1939 speech that many of the early Lankan kings listed in the Mahavamsa were in fact Tamils. This played into the hands of Sinhala chauvinists, who used it as an excuse to stir up anti-Tamil riots.

After independence, the lives of Tamils became increasingly difficult in the Sinhalese-dominated state, and their politicians opted for three broad strategies.

Some became members of the two ruling parties. Ponnambalam himself joined the UNP. Some of these people were cowards and collaborators, but most were pragmatists, or people who genuinely believed in a unitary Sri Lankan state. To this day, a small but significant number of Tamils, particularly those from privileged backgrounds, side with the government.

Other Tamils campaigned in opposition parties, notably the Federal Party. After several decades without success, the opposition parties became increasingly secessionist. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) ran on a separatist platform in the 1977 election, and won majorities in the North and East. It was the largest opposition party in parliament.

However, the Sinhalese changed the constitution in 1983, banning the advocacy of secession and requiring all holders of public office to commit themselves by oath to a unitary state. TULF members refused to take the oath, and were expelled from parliament. The Sinhalese-dominated state had successfully squeezed them out of democratic politics.

The third and final strategy was armed struggle. By the late 1970s, it had become clear to many Tamil nationalists that neither self-determination nor basic Tamil rights could be secured through constitutional means. Armed groups began to form, with the LTTE eventually winning out during the 1980s as the dominant force, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran.

My personal belief is that even in the dire circumstances in which the Tamils found themselves, the armed option was a mistake. It was, I think, part of the global ideology of the times. Only the most pressing and immediate peril can justify the taking of human life, and things had not reached that pass in Sri Lanka.

Within Sri Lanka, support for the LTTE remained considerable within the areas it controlled until recently, as well as within the Jaffna peninsula. There was a widespread perception among the northern Tamils that the LTTE were not so much an armed band, but part of the people – “our boys" – and their protectors against the brutal Sinhalese army.

However, there was also a fear of the LTTE, whose treatment of the Tamils under their “protection” was ruthless – necessarily so, they argued, given the wartime setting. But they were always seen by the Tamil populace as their masters, and never as their servants.

The LTTE also provided the Tamil populace with a strong negotiating hand. This would have been immensely useful, had it been used wisely. But whereas their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, proved brilliantly effective in building the LTTE into a potent and ruthless fighting force, he lacked the political intelligence to use their power effectively.

The LTTE are invariably referred to by the Sri Lankan government as terrorists. This is false propaganda – the clash in the North has been between armies – but that said, the LTTE has always been prepared to use terrorist tactics alongside military operations, to the great weakening of the Tamil cause.

It has killed ordinary civilians with impunity. Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous atrocities and human rights violations, including massacres of villages, bombs in public places, ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese and particularly Muslims, and child soldier recruitment.

The LTTE would retort that the Sri Lankan army and rioting Sinhalese civilians took the lives of far more innocent people than the LTTE ever killed. That is correct. But that does not make it all right for the LTTE to make killing and ethnic cleansing policies of its own.

The LTTE has also used murder to stifle dissent. Scores of intellectuals, who were no friends of the Sinhala nationalist cause, but who dared to criticise the LTTE, were murdered by the Tigers. Many of these were Tamils – Tamils who were not in any sense collaborating with or abetting their foes, but who were just trying to contribute in their own way, and dared to question the Tigers.

I will mention just two, Rajani Thiranagama and Neelan Tiruchelvam.

Rajani Thiranagama was a doctor and lecturer in anatomy at the University of Jaffna, She was also a feminist and human rights activist, who condemned violations by all sides – the Sri Lankan state, the Indian Peace Keeping Force, which at that time was occupying northern Sri Lanka, and the LTTE. Because she criticised the LTTE, they shot her dead outside her house in Jaffna in 1989. She had two young daughters. She has been mourned ever since, and became well-known when a film about her life, No More Tears Sister: An Anatomy of Hope and Betrayal, was released in 2005.

Neelan Tiruchelvam was an internationally respected academic and a leader of the TULF, who tried to work out a devolution deal with President Kumaratunga. The LTTE considered him a traitor for collaborating with their enemy on a deal that fell far short of secession, and so in 1999 they killed him with a suicide bomb on the streets of Colombo.

The LTTE might have had good reasons for not liking Rajani Thiranagama and Neelan Tiruchelvam – particularly Tiruchelvam, who was working with a murderous government – but that did not justify killing them.

And quite apart from the fact that murders of this kind are wicked, barbaric and unnecessary, the LTTE seemed to have no grasp of the dire international consequences of killing respected intellectual figures. It helped turn the liberal world, whose natural instincts would be to support an oppressed people, against the Tigers.

And the LTTE’s reckless miscalculations about the consequences of killing went further still. It was the murder of Rajiv Gandhi (along with many civilians) by a female suicide bomber in 1991 that turned India, whose instinct is to protect the Tamils, irrevocably against the LTTE. Not only the Tigers, but the Tamil people are paying now for this barbarism and stupidity, as India sits back and enjoys their defeat.

(4) The principal cause of the war - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

The principal driving force that led to conflict was Sinhalese nationalism.

Ceylon’s first prime minister, DS Senanayake, died in a riding accident and his party, the United National Party (UNP), was soon challenged and defeated by the Sinhala nationalist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Thereafter, in election after election, both parties played the race card shamelessly, whipping up nationalist sentiment and struggling to out-do each other to win the Sinhalese vote.

In so doing, they exacerbated racist sentiments among the Sinhalese, and marred Sinhalese cultural nationalism, giving it a dark edge it need not have had.

Whenever a party in power tried to compromise with the island’s minority communities, the party in opposition would raise a nationalist hullabaloo. The monks joined in. Step by step, nationalist and racist mores became ratcheted into the body politic and culture of Sinhalese Ceylon.

Indeed, from an early stage, the nationalist demon became a cultural force the political parties could not always control, and yet felt obliged to accommodate – in much the same way that militant Islam was first used, then feared, but nonetheless still accommodated and still used, by Muslim governments today, such as those of Pakistan and Malaysia.

Religion in the form of Buddhism is a major component of Sinhalese nationalism, and extreme nationalist Buddhist monks have played a major role in fanning the flames of conflict.

Driven on by ethno-religious nationalism, in part riding and in part being driven by the wave they helped create, successive Lankan governments enacted numerous pieces of legislation to bolster the rights of the Sinhalese at the expense of the Tamils.

A few examples: The 1956 Sinhala Only Act made Sinhala the sole official language of the country. Imagine the cultural and psychological effects of that on all sides. Moreover, Tamils in the civil service who could not speak Sinhala lost their jobs.

Over several decades, the state organised Sinhalese colonization of traditional Tamil areas. Imagine the cultural and psychological effects of that.

Other examples: the importing of Tamil language films, books and magazines from India was banned. Examinations for external degrees from the University of London, from which the Tamils had benefited, were abolished. Funding for Tamil students going to India for university education was stopped. Affirmative action schemes were introduced to make it easier for Sinhalese students to get into higher education, but harder for Tamils.

And along with legislative action came more general, communal racism. The worst of it was the pogroms of 1958, 1977 and 1983 in which thousands of Tamils had their homes and livelihoods destroyed, or were beaten, raped or killed. Tamilian cultural treasures were also systematically destroyed, most notoriously in the burning of the public library in Jaffna, which was one of the finest in South Asia and housed numerous unique manuscripts, now lost forever; but such spasms were just sudden, violent expressions of growing anti-Tamil sensibilities, spearheaded by right-wing zealots but spreading through the wider Sinhalese populace.

Even the renaming of Ceylon as Sri Lanka was a Sinhala nationalist step; “Sri” in this context means venerable in the Buddhist tradition. Indeed, the 1972 constitution which changed the state’s name also declared that the state should “give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly, it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism.”

(3) Britain's disastrous legacy - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

The Tamil minority did well under British rule, and were considered industrious and intelligent by their colonial masters. By contrast, the Sinhalese were considered indolent – much as the Malays were considered indolent by the British, or the Hutus by the Germans and Belgians. Identifying and favouring a minority group over a majority was a common trick of colonials the world over, and often had tragic consequences decades later.

Tamils also converted to Christianity more readily than the Sinhalese, and in consequence, received good European educations in missionary schools. As a result, English-speaking Tamils made up a disproportionately large part of the professional classes under the British. Ironically, successful Hindu Tamil mobilisation against religious conversion also led to increased self-awareness, and self-confidence, in the Tamil ethnic group.

The Sinhalese received less favour, and their ancient and magisterial culture was looked upon by the British with ignorance and disdain.

So when the British left in 1948, there was going to have to be some rebalancing in favour of the Sinhalese.

Britain had real concerns about whether Ceylon was capable of managing its ethnic diversity wisely. The pre-independence constitution established by the Donoughmore Commission involved an elaborate system to prevent the dominance of any one ethnic group, and lasted from 1931-1947.

Unfortunately, the subsequent Soulbury Commission of 1944 recommended a centralised system of government, trusting the Ceylonese, under the benign and inclusive leadership of DS Senanayake, to manage their affairs wisely. They did not.

The Soulbury Constitution was, in retrospect, asinine. Indeed, some Tamils would say that even a federal constitution would not have been enough, and that as in India, independence should have been accompanied by Partition.

(2) The warring parties - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

The Lankan conflict is between the state, which is multi-ethnic but Sinhalese-dominated, and secessionist Tamils, among whom the dominant force, for now at least, is the LTTE – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Eelam is the name the LTTE gives to the portion of North and East Sri Lanka it wants to hive off as an independent state.

According to official census data, the Sinhalese make up about 74% of the total population of Sri Lanka, and the Tamils 18 %. The Tamils and Sinhalese speak distinct languages with distinct origins: Tamil is a Dravidian language, whereas Sinhala has Sanskrit, Aryan roots. The Tamils are predominantly Hindu whereas the Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist, although there are many Christians in both groups.

In terms of physical appearance, one can sometimes distinguish Tamils and Sinhalese. There are, for instance, distinct, well-recognised stereotypes for the Jaffna Tamil and Kandyan Sinhalese, but people in both groups frequently share elements of the same generic “Lankan” look, and in fact there is considerable genetic overlap.

In places like Colombo where the Sinhalese and Tamil populations are more mixed, it is often only by language that individual Tamils and Sinhalese can be told apart. In the 1983 Colombo pogrom, Tamils were butchered not on the basis of their appearance, but their inability to speak Sinhala shibboleths.

Neither are the Tamils and Sinhalese demographically or culturally homogeneous populations. For instance, the Tamils of the East and those of the North have many social and cultural differences, while the Indian Tamils, whose ancestors were shipped recently in by the British to work their coffee and tea plantations, have played little role in the conflict.

One should keep in mind too that besides the Sinhalese and Tamils, there are many smaller ethnic and religious groups in Sri Lanka.

These include the Muslims, who have diverse origins but most of whom speak Tamil; various groups of Burghers with mixed Asian and European descent; small groups with other descents, such as the Colombo Chetties, whose ancestors were Indian traders, and finally the Veddhas – the aboriginal inhabitants of Lanka, who have been treated vilely by the Sri Lankan state but were too weak to do anything about it, and now seem doomed to extinction.

The genetic and linguistic ancestors of Lanka’s indigenous Tamils and Sinhalese first came to the island at least two thousand years ago. The Tamilian forbears presumably came from South India, where Tamil is also spoken. The Sinhalese probably came from the North of India – the best guess is from lands in or around what are now Bengal and Orissa.

Hot-headed oafs on both sides of the fence squabble about who came first, but the point is that speakers of both tongues have had ancestors on the island since ancient times.

Ancient too are the sporadic animosities. The Sinhalese manuscript known as the Mahavamsa, or Great Chronicle, which dates back to the 5th Century CE (and derives from earlier texts), tells of the victory of King Dutugamanu, a forbear of today’s Sinhalese, over Elara, a forbear of the Tamils, in about 150 BCE.

That said, for most of the time since Christ walked the earth, speakers of the tongues that evolved into modern-day Tamil and Sinhalese have got along, swapped cultures, and swapped genes. Genetic studies have indeed shown that the Sinhalese’ closest genetic relatives are, by a distance, their Tamil-speaking co-habitees.

As for Ceylon itself, for much of its history there were different kingdoms in different parts of the island. Immediately prior to the encroachment of the Europeans, there were three main kingdoms – in Jaffna, Kotte (close to modern Colombo) and Kandy. It was the departing British who left Ceylon as a single, integrated state for the first time in many hundreds of years.

(1) One conflict among many - An outsider's comments on the Sri Lankan conflict

At the last strip of land held by the Tamil Tigers falls to the Sri Lankan army, Rochbane has several observations about the conflict, starting with this, the first of twelve posts.

First, a few provisos.

Roachbane is not Sri Lankan, but has significant contacts, including highly-placed Sinhalese and Tamils, both inside Sri Lanka and internationally.

My first-hand experience of the conflict is inevitably more limited than that of Sri Lankans, and its emotional significance is less personally profound. Nonetheless, as with current affairs anywhere in the world, outside views have their place.

And at least I hope not to be pigeon-holed as belonging to one side or the other.

For readers who don't know much about the conflict, these twelve posts will provide you with a useful summary of its origins, and where things are now.

For Sri Lankans, please read the posts as an outsider's view, without feeling too sensitive. I am critical of all sides, at times in robust language; but I would not have written the posts if I did not revere Sri Lanka and all its peoples.

Now to my comments.

The Sri Lankan conflict is one in a long line of ethno-nationalist conflicts that arose in the second half of the twentieth century, when colonial powers departed (as per the British) or old orders died (as per the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia).

The departing powers left poison behind, in the form of nationalist sentiments, and states - centralised states for the most part, when in many cases states had not even existed before the colonial era.

In the rush for power, ethnic and religious groups became more consolidated and self-aware, often through the leadership of racial zealots or power-hungry fools. Rival groups vied for control, or sought self-determination and secession. Either way, war followed.

Some Sri Lankans like to feel that their war is special and unique, and that outsiders cannot understand it. But while every conflict has unique features, the Sri Lankan civil war can be understood as just one more postcolonial bloodbath.